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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the idea of privacy in the world of ‘Intimacy 
2.0’, the use of Web 2.0 social networking technologies and 
multimedia for the routine posting of intimate details of users’ 
lives. It will argue that, although privacy is often conceived as a 
right with benefits that accrue to the individual, it is better seen as 
a public good, whose benefits accrue to the community in general. 
In that case, the costs of allowing invasions of one’s privacy do 
not solely fall on the individual who is unwise enough to do so, 
but also on wider society. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The status of privacy is much disputed in political philosophy. An 
important debate has been conducted over the last couple of 
centuries as to whether it is a human right, or merely a preference. 
If there is a right to privacy (“the right to be let alone”), as was 
argued in a classic paper by Warren and Brandeis [33], then 
everyone, regardless of culture, ethnicity or nationality, is entitled 
to protection. If not, then it is merely a preference, however 
powerful, which there is no obligation to protect. Most major 
legal jurisdictions recognise some rights to privacy. 
In all cases, the right to privacy is recognised as potentially in 
conflict with other rights, most obviously to free speech. 
Furthermore, many people enjoy a certain level of exhibitionism 
(also pandering to a certain level of voyeurism in their audience). 
Television programmes like the Big Brother franchise and 
confessional talkshows such as that hosted by Jerry Springer have 
not only big audiences, but also long waiting lists of potential 
participants. 
Technology in particular can alter the boundaries between public 
and private. In 1890 Warren and Brandeis were concerned about 
the development of the portable camera, but in recent years the 
World Wide Web, particularly Web 2.0, has raised challenges for 
privacy, as it brings together more voices, more recording and 
retrieval technologies, and a larger capacity for the incidental 
gathering of details of people’s private lives [15]. Interactive Web 
2.0 technology has led to an increasing tendency for people to 
publish texts, photographs, videos, locations, tags and preferences 
online, thereby placing a good deal of private life on record [21]. 
Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg has argued that social 
changes mean that privacy is no longer a norm [11]. I call this 
tendency ‘Intimacy 2.0’. 
Whether privacy is a right, is essential, or is harmful to the 
community is a topic of ideological dispute, but the disputants 
agree on one thing: that privacy is basically a private good, whose 
benefits accrue to the individual [6], and which pits the interests 
of the individual against those of the community. In many 
circumstances there is a justifiable social benefit from breaches of 
privacy [8]. 
I shall dispute this common ground in the context of Intimacy 2.0. 
I will be concerned solely with the supposedly least problematic 
case: people releasing information that (a)  is true, (b)  directly 
concerns themselves, and (c) if it harms anyone at all, directly 
harms  only themselves. I will argue that even in these cases, 
privacy is not only a private good, but also a public good, some of 
whose benefits accrue to the community. As such, our rights to 
privacy need to be balanced with responsibilities to preserve 
privacy. 
2.  PRIVACY AS A PRIVATE GOOD 
In this section I will rehearse the thinking behind the idea that 
privacy is a private good, focusing on two opposed ideological 
views, liberalism and communitarianism. 
2.1  The Liberal Argument 
Liberalism is intended to protect the individual’s freedom, not 
only to do what others reckon he or she ought to do, but what he 
or she wishes to do. Liberalism removes restrictions not only on 
action, but also on the definition of the good life. The classic text 
is John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty [18], where what we can call the 
Mill test delineates the proper scope for community action. “That 
the only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over 
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is 
not a sufficient warrant.” 
2.1.1  The Value of Privacy 
People may prefer privacy, but that does not of itself obligate 
societies to protect it; after all, I have a strong liking for 
champagne but I have no claim on others to provide me with it, to 
my deep and abiding regret. Privacy must play some kind of 
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 important role beyond being merely pleasant, in order for people 
to have a right to it. 
Liberal theorists locate this role in the protection of autonomy, 
that is informed and uncoerced freedom. To act freely, a person 
should have accurate expectations of what is known about her; 
“only on the basis of the (fragile) stability of her fabric of 
expectations, knowledge, assumptions and selective self-
disclosure is it possible for a person to exercise control over her 
self-presentation and thus, in a broader sense, to enjoy the 
possibility of a self-determined life” [26]. Note that this control 
needs to be authentic and not merely a (possibly mistaken) 
perception; if someone falsely believes that a certain piece of 
information has been kept private, and on that basis believes she 
is acting autonomously, she is nevertheless not doing so. Her 
behaviour, though uncoerced in the sense of meeting her 
preferences, is not informed, because her understanding of the 
situation is distorted, and her preferences have been formed in 
misleading circumstances. 
Hence the point of privacy is to maximise the accuracy of the 
individual’s expectations of others’ views of her, and therefore to 
increase her ability to act autonomously. Privacy plays a central 
role in the liberal view of free action, and is hence much more 
than a mere preference. 
2.1.2  Privacy as a Right 
On the liberal account, therefore, privacy is an individual’s right 
that helps secure his or her autonomy in a complex and 
demanding world. If a person wishes to give his or her privacy 
away, by placing details on the Web, appearing on Big Brother or 
simply wandering around naked with the curtains open, it follows 
from this that they are harming themselves by reducing their 
ability to act autonomously. They do this presumably because 
they believe that they will get greater benefits without privacy 
than with it. We may believe that they are wrongheaded, but if we 
apply the Mill test we have no liberal ground for preventing them. 
2.2  The Communitarian Argument 
Liberal protection of individuals’ freedom has social costs. The 
ideology known as communitarianism maintains that individual 
freedoms only make sense against the background of a well-
functioning community, and therefore when individual rights 
undermine community health they need to be curbed. Amitai 
Etzioni has argued that privacy rights have the potential to 
undermine community cohesion [8]. He claims that privacy is a 
contingent concept dependent on culture-specific assumptions and 
legal prohibitions. Far from being universal, it is being 
reformulated all the time (for example in Web 2.0); far from being 
an unbounded good, it should be balanced against other social 
concerns. 
Communitarians are not opposed to privacy tout court, and 
represent themselves as being better protectors of privacy than 
liberals, whom they see as failing to provide a congenial context 
for a rewarding private life. For instance, most of our protection 
from social and political tyranny comes from our associations, 
which we support with feelings such as loyalty, conformism and 
shame, precisely the sort of surrender of privacy and autonomy 
that the liberal rejects [27]. 
2.3  Technical and Legal Discourse 
Given the tacit agreement on this issue between otherwise 
radically opposed ideologues, it is not surprising that most legal 
and technical discourse adopts the same assumption. For instance, 
the privacy activism website Pleaserobme.com
1 publishes a live 
feed of Twitter posts which have revealed that their authors are 
not at home. The anticipated harm is that the author him- or 
herself may have given away too much personal information and 
created a personal vulnerability. Privacy-enhancing technologies 
are aimed at the individual, driven by fears of fraud, identity theft 
and loss of large databases, and are intended to give people 
control over their information when they use the Internet [10]. 
Companies such as Garlik
2 and Reputation Defender
3 provide 
services to help data subjects control their individual digital 
footprints. 
In US law, privacy is conceived as a tort, i.e. a harm to an 
individual for which another is responsible. There are two points 
to note. First, the individual who is the subject of the information 
is the direct and only victim of the tort, as the liberal and 
communitarian argue. Second, in the cases we are considering, 
the information about the victim is released by him- or herself, 
thereby being responsible for the harm, ruling out any possibility 
of a tort. 
Another type of approach pursued in Europe is data protection, 
legal protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal information [32]. This approach is even clearer in its 
assumption of where the benefits and costs of privacy will be 
found, as it explicitly balances the privacy of the individual with 
the benefit for society of information aggregation and processing 
[22]. 
3.  INTIMACY 2.0 
The conception of privacy of Section 2 is ultimately self-
defeating if people see a benefit from rejecting it. They may have 
a right to it, but equally it is a private good, and so only they 
benefit from it. It seems to follow that only they suffer from their 
ignoring it. In this section I will examine how this behaviour 
plays out in Web 2.0. 
3.1  Behaviour 
Intimacy is an important aspect of healthy interpersonal relations, 
a key part of which is information-sharing and self-revelation. In 
the Web 2.0 world, Intimacy 2.0 is also achieved partly by self-
disclosure [12]. Online disclosures are searchable, replicable and 
quasi-permanent, unlike the offline world where memory is the 
main medium. Furthermore, it is harder to track who has had 
online access to information, and to erect online obstacles to 
strangers or enemies getting hold of it. Nevertheless, people have 
a stronger tendency to self-disclosure online than offline [12]. 
Intimacy 2.0 reverses the standard (Weberian) view of trust where 
trustworthiness precedes and causes trust, and is governed by a 
(Durkheimian) view where trust comes first and trustworthiness 
later [20]. Many social networkers, bloggers and online diarists 
assume that readers will be sympathetic and worthy of the 
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intimacy, even though these assumptions are often incorrect [7]. 
This relative lack of filter is an important difference between 
intimacy in the offline world and Intimacy 2.0. 
Surveys (e.g. [13]) have shown a relative lack of concern about 
privacy, while actual behaviour is even less protective than users 
believe or claim [12]. Users of social networking sites believe that 
they have more control over their information than they actually 
have, although as noted they also trust that (most of) those who 
have access to information about them will be benign. Some 
protect privacy by posting some inaccurate information. Some 
believe that privacy protection is in effect futile, and their 
continued networking implies they indeed have few privacy 
concerns. Equally, outcries over services perceived to have 
‘crossed the line’ imply that there is a line that can be crossed. 
The outcries also show that social networkers are vigilant about 
issues that concern them. For instance, in November 2009 
Facebook supposedly simplified its complex privacy policies, but 
many suspected that the aim was to get people to publish more 
information than before, thanks to new defaults and a few tweaks 
to valuable sources of information [3]. 
3.2   “Get Over It”: Technological 
Determinism 
It is in this context that Zuckerberg made the remarks discussed at 
the beginning of this paper [11]. Privacy has always been under 
threat as soon as digitised information began to erode the practical 
obscurity that paper-based storage affords [21]. As early as 1999, 
Scott McNealy, then-CEO of Sun Microsystems, famously 
announced “you have zero privacy anyway. Get over it!” [16]. 
This technological determinism rests on the assumption that Web 
technology (and specifically social networking and Intimacy 2.0) 
can empower its users in such a way as to compensate them to 
their own satisfaction for any loss of autonomy (as we shall see in 
the next subsection, it may anyway provide mechanisms which 
preserve autonomy). As this only harms themselves (by the 
hypothesis of section 2 above), then the Mill test prevents others 
taking action to protect them against themselves. In any case, 
because the Web’s basic design is an everything-goes knowledge 
sharing technology, building deep privacy protection into it would 
cripple its decentralised structure, which most would agree would 
be a far greater harm than the destruction of privacy. Finally, use 
of the Web is voluntary, and therefore there is no tort which can 
be seized upon – as the privacy-invading nature of the Web is 
well-understood, the user himself is largely responsible for any 
loss of privacy. 
So: get over it! 
3.3  The Generation Gap 
Technological determinism also has a social aspect, because 
young people are substantially less concerned about privacy than 
the rest of us, and since they will be dead less quickly their 
attitudes will be more influential on future trends. 
Work by Abril has indicated that one important generational shift 
is in the very concept of privacy under consideration [1]. Whereas 
older people see privacy as a matter of control – one has the 
luxury of determining how information about oneself is 
disseminated – young people see it as anonymity – they surrender 
control over dissemination on the assumption that information 
cannot be traced back and associated directly and publicly with its 
subject, even if it is not private in the sense of being controlled by 
the subject. Anonymity may help support autonomy if control is 
absent, because even if the information about a person is in the 
public domain, if it cannot be associated with her then it does not 
materially affect her expectations of what is known about her. 
This focus on anonymity chimes in with a point made by danah 
boyd that teenagers’ offline privacy concerns are mostly to do 
with keeping information away from teachers and parents. They 
have very little control of context in the way that an adult has 
(e.g. the occupier of a house has rights to prevent unauthorised 
access, whereas parents cannot be kept out of a teenager’s 
bedroom), and so are more concerned with controlling audiences 
by finding unmediated spaces in which to socialise [5]. However, 
that does not mean that they have a good grasp of how to do that 
[4], [5], [24], and indeed they do not have much of an idea of how 
much and what is being collected about them by third parties [24]. 
In particular, young people tend to consider how the people they 
know will access and respond to their profiles, and consequently 
put a lot of potentially sensitive information in them. 55% of US 
teenagers online have social network profiles, in which 82% 
include a real first name, 79% images of themselves and 49% the 
name of their school [14]. In practice, the anonymity that 
youngsters crave is harder to find than they often believe [7]. 
They place Durkheimian trust in their social networking friends, 
but they are often unaware that, via their social network sites, 
they are connected with a far larger network of corporations, 
institutions and individuals [24]
The law, on this issue, is a ‘digital immigrant’, supporting control 
rather than anonymity. However, the online world is not very 
geared towards control and hence the law lags behind. It provides 
the wrong sort of protection for those who crave anonymity, and 
inadequate protection for those who would prefer control [1]. 
Up till now I have left unexamined the argument of section 2 that 
privacy is a private good. In the next section, I will consider some 
reasons for thinking that the harms of a breach of privacy may be 
distributed more widely. 
4.  PRIVACY AS A PUBLIC GOOD 
Most discussion of privacy has focused on harms to the 
individual, either the self-revealer or others who are directly 
implicated in information revealed. For instance, a recent ‘map’ 
of the territory focuses almost entirely on the individual [15], 
looking at actors and relationships that can take part “in a privacy 
incursion”. Of course this is part of the picture, but it ignores the 
cases where what is important is a pattern of privacy incursions, 
an array of actors and an emergent harm. Solove draws attention 
to the creation of a ‘culture of unease’ [30], but it is my 
contention that societal harm can go further than this, and in this 
section I will suggest some of the ways. 
4.1  Pollution of Public Space: The “Tyranny 
of Intimacy 2.0” 
Sociologist Richard Sennett has examined the imbalance between 
public and private experience, arguing that “intimacy is a 
tyranny” and that it is “a field of vision and an expectation of 
human relations … a localizing of human experience, so that what 
is close to the immediate circumstances of life is paramount” [28]. 
Similarly, Hannah Arendt drew attention to the importance for the quality of public life of putting distance between it and the private 
sphere. For her, “the reality of the public realm relies on the 
simultaneous presence of innumerable perspectives … for which 
no common measurement or denominator can ever be devised” 
[2]. She follows Machiavelli in insisting that personal virtues such 
as ‘goodness’ (and indeed ‘badness’) have no place in public life, 
where more utilitarian and social qualities such as ‘effectiveness’ 
and ‘justice’ are needed. 
Sennett warns of intimacy tyrannically denying “the reality and 
worth of impersonal life.” High quality public decision-making 
demands objectivity, evidence-based policy and authoritative 
behaviour, yet the spread of intimacy and the ease of transmission 
of intrusive detail has turned public life into a celebrity-driven 
circus where politicians are judged on the basis of whether we 
would want a beer with them, rather than their intellectual or 
managerial capabilities. Intimacy 2.0 has led to the ubiquity of 
politicians on Web 2.0 platforms. Political philosophy is now 
reduced in complexity to the level of a tweet, and the length of 
pause allowed for reflection is being shortened as political 
discourse moves in blogosphere time [25]. This can only make the 
private lives of politicians more public than they already are, 
undermining the impersonal life that Sennett wants to defend. 
4.2  Web 2.0 and the Development of Identity 
A profile provides a means of creating and controlling identities. 
Young people in particular, whose identities are malleable and 
who are interested in exploration and creativity, find this 
important [1], [5], [24]. Links with the identities of others (and 
other online resources) are important tools here [23], and hence an 
online presence seems key to the effective use of this identity-
exploring mechanism. The potential for embarrassment and 
shame in Intimacy 2.0 is problematic in this context. As Martha 
Nussbaum has argued, shaming produces an enduring reduction in 
social status, and a degraded identity [19], hardly the empowering 
phenomenon that advocates of the technology might hope for. 
Although an adult personality is not in such a state of flux, we 
negotiate different types of context with different methods of self-
preservation, as Goffman argued many years ago [9]. Different 
personas are crafted for varying levels of public or private 
consumption, and the Web has quickly become an important 
space for experimentation with identity. “On the one hand, we 
maintain an attitude of external distance; … this way you can 
relax, you are delivered of the burden of being what you are. … 
On the other hand, the screen persona I create for myself can be 
‘more myself’ than my ‘real-life’ persona … in so far as it reveals 
aspects of myself I would never dare to admit in real life” [34]. 
Hence a chilling effect caused by bad experiences with Intimacy 
2.0 will be as devastating to the identities of adults as those of 
younger people. 
4.3  Emergent Associations 
As well as identity, the associations we form are also important to 
provide an agreeable social context, and to act as protection 
against social pressures [27]. Relational data can be extremely 
important for extracting information about associations, and also 
about the individuals in the associations (even those who do not 
feature strongly in the data). Traffic data and clickthroughs can 
provide an accurate picture of technologically mediated emergent 
associations, and it has been argued that existing legal paradigms 
in the US have failed to protect such associations from snooping 
using network analysis [31]. 
Facebook can assemble a network of acquaintances of an 
individual Facebook user, allowing non-Facebook users to receive 
emails demonstrating Facebook’s knowledge of their own lives. 
An example: I received an email on 15
th February 2010 
suggesting nine Facebook people I may know – I knew seven of 
them, three of them quite casually (one of whom I had not 
contacted for five years). The harm to me was not high, but it is 
extraordinary that Facebook could so easily assemble such 
information about someone who has tried to avoid dealings with it 
(what could an authoritarian government do with this 
technology?), yet my privacy from Zuckerberg and his minions 
has been reduced not by my own actions, but by those of others. 
4.4  Reasonable Expectations 
One of the most important pillars of privacy protection in law is 
that of reasonable expectations [17]: one’s privacy is protected 
when one is in a context where a reasonable person should expect 
privacy, and not otherwise. This is a normative concept, and so is 
not completely undermined by Zuckerberg-style technological 
determinism. McArthur argues [17] that key factors in 
determining reasonable expectations are the mischance principle 
that we cannot reasonably expect something to be private that 
someone could easily discover without much effort (even if in 
fact it is discovered with difficulty), and the voluntary principle 
that our reasonable expectations are proportional to our efforts to 
protect our privacy. On this basis, he argues that Internet 
browsing histories and emails cannot be reasonably expected to 
be private. 
This dodges the important question. The mischance principle 
allows a substantial mismatch between the effort needed to get the 
information and the effort actually expended. As an example, I 
can’t reasonably expect my purchase of The Communist 
Manifesto to be private, as I bought it in a bookshop and people 
could see it in my hand at the till, even if my complaint is about 
someone who found out through some more intrusive method. But 
this seems a very permissive principle in the case where someone 
has aggregated all the facts about me that someone might collect 
via a mischance in a database, and is performing inference across 
that database to discover patterns beyond the data. This kind of 
behaviour by information-based companies stretches the 
mischance principle a long way. 
Furthermore, it ignores the distinction between private and public 
harm. If a significant minority (or majority) of people behave in 
such as way as to lower their own reasonable expectation of 
privacy, and if ‘reasonable expectation’ is a normative concept 
across a society, then they have lowered my reasonable 
expectations. My expectations could be very high, but the actions 
of others could turn them from reasonable to unreasonable (it is 
for this reason that Etzioni thinks reasonable expectations are a 
bad guide [8]). 
Recall my intrusive email from Facebook. On McArthur’s 
argument, my reasonable expectations are neither here nor there 
because of the mischance principle; none of these relationships 
was a secret. Yet only a giant corporation with access to gross 
amounts of data and computing power could have assembled this 
information. As Solove argues, “a more nuanced view of privacy 
suggests that [Web 2.0 cases involve] taking an event that 
occurred in one context and significantly altering its nature – by 
making it permanent and widespread” (my emphasis) [29]. There 
is a massive transformation between storing and cataloguing. The Web 2.0 context turns the mischance principle into the largest 
loophole imaginable. 
Reasonable expectations are closely linked with social norms, yet 
it is arguable that online social norms are less embedded and more 
vulnerable to manipulation. Assumptions, knowledge and 
behaviour of Web users are highly heterogeneous (much more so 
than offline), and so the protection reasonable expectations 
provide may be naturally low anyway. Intimacy 2.0 undermines 
them further. 
4.5  The Death of Autonomy 
The net result of all this is a dramatic reduction in autonomy. As 
Abril argues, “the more people hear stories of others getting 
‘busted’ on [social networks], the less likely they will be to share 
their stories and opinions. … We can no longer erase or ignore 
our pasts. Such surveillance changes behaviour. Awareness of 
monitoring can make a person feel extremely uncomfortable and 
ultimately lead to self-censorship, inhibition, and a chilling of 
discourse” [1]. Although free speech is vital for democracy, so is 
privacy: “more discourse about politics occurs in personal 
conversations than on soapboxes or street corners” [29]. Intimacy 
2.0 in effect blurs the distinction between personal conversation 
and soapbox (in the same way as social networking has blurred 
the distinction between friends and acquaintances). 
Most benefits of autonomy accrue to the individual, but the ability 
of people to behave autonomously is also a mark of a good 
society (cf. Orwell’s 1984 as a description of society without 
autonomy). If Intimacy 2.0 reduces our collective capacity for 
autonomy, then that is an additional public harm. 
5.  CONCLUSION: PRIVACY RIGHTS AND 
PRIVACY RESPONSIBILITIES 
The upshot of the arguments of the previous section is that the 
unwise behaviour ceases to be ‘only’ self-harm and becomes a 
type of environmental pollution, thereby failing to meet Mill’s 
test. For the liberal, the importance of Intimacy 2.0 must now be 
measured, not against self-harm, but harm to the community. 
These arguments also apply to communitarians, even though they 
do not value privacy as highly, because of the indirect harms to 
the community. In the Intimacy 2.0 context, Etzioni’s claim that 
the community rights trump individual privacy rights entails that 
people should preserve their privacy. In short, as well as the 
privacy  rights that are championed by the liberal, the 
communitarian must agree that there are privacy responsibilities 
too. 
This normative claim requires enforcement mechanisms, which 
may take the form of regulations, technological measures or 
ideally social norms. However, consideration of the possibility of 
norms of behaviour developing that enable people to internalise 
these privacy responsibilities (which the McNealy/Zuckerberg 
technological determinist position claims is impossible) must be 
deferred to another paper; for preliminary discussions about 
technical and legal issues see [1], [15], [22] and [29]. Methods to 
measure self-disclosure in its context must also be developed [12]. 
Perhaps the most effective step will simply be raising awareness 
[21], as psychological research has shown that people primed to 
think about privacy issues will disclose less about themselves 
[12]. 
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